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RISK SIMULATION MODELS OF RUNWAY OPERATION 
Henk A.P. Blom, blom@nlr.nl, NLR, Amsterdam 
Kevin M. Corker, kevin.corker@sjsu.edu, SJSU, San Jose, CA 
Sybert H. Stroeve, stroeve@nlr.nl, NLR, Amsterdam 
 
Abstract 
The integration of a human performance model 
(Air Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis 
System, Air MIDAS) and an accident risk assessment 
methodology (Traffic Organization and Perturbation 
AnalyZer, TOPAZ) was investigated in order to learn 
about the similarities and differences of their models, 
to demonstrate the feasibility of such integration, and 
the integration impact on accident risk assessment.   
The application example for this assessment is an 
airport surface operation in which a taxiing aircraft 
makes an unintended incursion into a departure 
runway.  This paper describes the process for 
integrating the simulation based models of human 
performance for this example, and presents the result 
of this integration up to the level of risk of collision 
between two aircraft.§ 
1.  Introduction 
In the analysis and design of advanced 
operations in complex, dynamic, human-machine 
systems, accident risk assessment is a critical 
component of effective system engineering.  
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques 
typically model such complex system by assigning 
conditional probabilities of the success, or failure for 
system operations into fault and event trees (e.g. 
Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). Subsequently, an 
assessment of risk is undertaken by evaluating the 
combined effects of the conditional probabilities in 
these fault and event trees. The role and contribution 
of the human operator has proven to be a significant 
element to both accident risk (Hollnagel, 1993), and 
to system safety and effectiveness (Dekker 2001).  
The development of models that represent the 
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contribution of the human operator to risk has been 
explored for some 30 years (Swain & Guttman 1983).  
The function of the human operator was either 
assigned a probability of success or failure, as would 
be provided for any system component, and the 
“integration” was the inclusion of those probabilities 
in the overall system success failure assessment.  In a 
more sophisticated approach the process of 
assessment of human performance characteristics is 
based on the context of control as described by 
(Hollnagel, 1993). Here the conditional probabilities 
for human activities reflect the impact of the context 
on human operator control modes.  Control mode 
selection refers to a qualitative shift in activities 
performed and the detailed characteristics of their 
performance. The parameters of performance such as 
time to react or time to visually detect a target would 
reflect the subject matter expert assessment of 
performance under stress. Typically, these 
performance characteristics are assigned based on 
expert knowledge elicitation regarding the impact of 
the context on human performance (such as 
probability of mishearing a clearance).  
A serious limitation of fault and event tree 
based PRA is its inability to evaluate the effects of  
concurrent and dynamic behavior on accident risk. 
The remedy is to exploit stochastic dynamical 
modeling and Monte Carlo simulation of the 
concurrent and dynamic processes for accident risk 
assessment (e.g. Labeau et al., 2000), including the 
safety engineering directed modeling and simulation 
of a human operator (e.g. Cacciabue, 1998). In order 
to apply this approach to air traffic management,  
multiple human operators and their interactions with 
each other and with aircraft and ground systems have 
to be modeled and simulated.  
This creates three kinds of challenges. First, the 
architecture of established risk assessment and fast-
time system performance models has tended to be 
incompatible with interactive human performance 
model architectures. Second, the speed of human 
performance model-based simulations has been 
considered a bottleneck in the operation. Third, the 
granularity or degree of detail required to account for 
impact on human performance has been considered 
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out of scale in consideration of large system 
operations with critical human cognitive capabilities 
in the millisecond range.  
Both with the human performance model Air-
MIDAS (Corker, 2000) and with the accident risk 
assessment methodology TOPAZ (Blom et al., 2001, 
2003; Stroeve et al., 2003), significant and 
complementary headway has been made in 
successfully addressing these issues. This makes the 
integration of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ a valuable 
topic of collaborative research in aviation safety 
assessment. The objective of this integration is to 
combine the significant advances established in 
individual human performance representation and 
human performance factors (human factors in general 
and human cognitive behavior in particular) through 
large-scale simulations for accident risk assessment. 
As an objective test for the success of this integration 
we  hypothesize that this combination allows Air-
MIDAS to provide simulation results for individual 
human operators which improves the accident risk 
assessment. In addition we hypothesize that an 
integrated accident risk simulation model is able to 
illuminate the Air-MIDAS model entities (either 
specific operators, functions within an operator, or 
interaction among individuals) which are most 
critical in managing the accident risk level. The aim 
of the current paper aims to study the first hypothesis. 
The testing of the second hypothesis will be 
addressed in a follow-up study.        
Through several stages of development over a 
period of 4 years, the two modeling teams, NLR and 
San Jose State University have succeeded in 
identifying a method for integration of the two 
techniques, implemented that integration and applied 
it, as a demonstration, to a runway incursion and 
surface operation example. Such operations have 
been a particular focus both by Eurocontrol and by 
FAA (e.g. Cardosi&Yost, 2001). The aviation 
community continues to be concerned with accident 
risk and runway operations and several technologies 
have been under development to mitigate this risk.  
Given the relevance of these operations to both safety 
risk and human performance, an integrated 
simulation of the baseline conditions for runway 
incursion avoidance was undertaken by Air-MIDAS 
and TOPAZ simulation toolset TAXIR for this 
operation.  
2.  Integration of complementary 
human modeling approaches 
Because of the complementary objectives and 
separate developments of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ 
their human performance modeling approaches show 
similarities and differences. Their potentially 
complimentary functions form the reason why this  
integration is so useful and challenging at the same 
time. In the course of the integration study the 
complementary human performance modeling details 
of both approaches have become clear. A short 
explanation of this is given next, including an 
overview in Table 1.  
Table 1 Human performance modeling in Air-
MIDAS and TOPAZ  
 Air-MIDAS TOPAZ 
Management 
modes 
Max-load or 
Even-load 
None 
Control Modes Matching with 
Rasmussen’s 
SRK (Skill, 
Rule, 
Knowledge) 
Matching with 
Hollnagel’s 
tactical and 
opportunistic 
control  modes 
A 
Switching 
between modes 
Fixed 
thresholds 
Thresholds 
with hysteresis 
Task 
Scheduling 
Goal oriented 
subtask 
scheduling 
Priority rules 
for aggregated 
tasks 
Resources 
model 
Multiple: 
Visual, 
Auditory, 
Cognitive, 
Psychomotor 
Aggregation 
on the basis of 
time-critical 
tasks/resources 
combinations 
B 
Memory model Procedural 
(with decay) 
Declarative 
(with decay) 
Knowledge 
(no decay) 
Aggregated 
(no decay) 
 
C SA model SA of one 
human only 
Multi Agent 
SA and 
interactions  
D Human error Is result of  
detailed 
modelling 
Amalberti’s 
error recovery 
model is added 
E Behaviour of 
Non-human 
entities 
Nominal Nominal & 
Non-Nominal 
F Specification 
language 
Air-MIDAS 
specific, based 
on LISP 
Dynamically 
Coloured Petri 
Nets (DCPN) 
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A. Control Modes: In TOPAZ the control modes are 
chosen to represent the tactical and opportunistic 
control modes of Hollnagel, whereas Air-
MIDAS uses Rasmussen’s SRK modes. In 
TOPAZ the control modes are primarily 
responsible for the task processing speed and the 
error probability, while in Air-MIDAS, the 
control mode defines the task scheduling 
mechanism. In Air-MIDAS the cognitive control 
mode switching and activity selection depends 
on the available time to complete the tasks, 
where the available time is called the look-ahead 
time in Air-MIDAS. In TOPAZ, the cognitive 
control mode switching depends on the number 
of tasks to be processed at a given time. 
Switching between control modes happens in 
Air-MIDAS without any hysteresis, and with 
significant hysteresis in TOPAZ. Air-MIDAS 
uses management modes for the goal scheduling, 
while TOPAZ has no management modes. 
B. Task scheduling/Resources/Memory: Air-
MIDAS uses task analysis and Wickens’ model 
for multiple resources. TOPAZ uses Wickens 
also, however subtasks and resources are 
aggregated in a fixed pattern, according to the 
time critical task/resources combinations. Hence, 
for each task, information regarding the result of 
the task is modeled and not the resources leading 
towards this result. Air-MIDAS also has a rather 
detailed memory model, which includes memory 
decay. TOPAZ does not model human memory 
decay. 
C. SA Model: TOPAZ aims to address all 
combinations of SA differences between the 
multiple agents in the model. Air-MIDAS 
models individual awareness in its upadateable 
world representation, but currently does not 
include awareness among operators. 
D. Human error characteristics of Air-MIDAS is the 
emergent result of the detailed modelling under 
A and B. In TOPAZ the characteristics are added 
on top of A and B, using literature and expert 
knowledge on human error types, error recovery  
and frequencies. 
E. Behaviour of Non-human entities: Only nominal 
behaviour is modelled in Air-MIDAS, whereas 
TOPAZ models both nominal and non-nominal 
levels. 
F. Specification language: Air MIDAS uses a 
dedicated LISP-based model notation, whereas 
TOPAZ uses a Petri Net based  model 
specification language (Everdij & Blom, 2005). 
For an effective integration of Air-MIDAS and 
TOPAZ the complementary modeling approaches 
should be taken into account. In order to accomplish 
this, integration applies at the following three levels: 
• Context level: This ensures that similar 
application contexts are being considered. 
This requires clarity about issues such as 
boundaries, operation and task analysis. 
• Model level: In order to ensure that the 
model integration is done appropriately, there 
is need for an understanding how Air-
MIDAS and TOPAZ models complement 
each other.  
• Parameter level: In order to ensure that 
similar parameter values are being used, there 
is a need to use Air-MIDAS detailed output  
as input by TOPAZ simulations.  
 
Integration at the model level ensures that the 
simulation scenario under examination is jointly 
represented in the two modeling systems. This allows 
identification of values for specific parameters of 
human performance in the TOPAZ simulation model 
to be supplied by the Air MIDAS simulation. These 
parameter values are generated in Monte Carlo runs 
of the human performance model and subsequently 
supplied as input to improving TOPAZ simulations. 
In so far as the modeling paradigms allow similar 
representation, this parameter exchange is 
straightforward. For example, simulation of pilot 
reaction time to recognition of an incursion by the 
taxiing aircraft is represented in both modeling 
processes, hence reaction time is a straight forward 
parameter value to exchange.   
3.  Integration at the three levels 
3.1 Application context 
The following operational concept for crossing 
of an active runway is being considered. A simplified 
representation of the runway configuration is used, as 
shown in Figure 1. It consists of one runway with a 
crossing at a length by3  from the runway start 
threshold. The crossing has remotely controlled 
stopbars on both sides of the runway. The runway is 
being used for taking off aircraft. The traffic crossing 
over the runway accounts for traffic between apron(s) 
and a second runway. The involved human operators 
include the start-up controller, the ground controller, 
per runway a runway controller, the departure 
controller, and the pilots flying and pilots not flying 
of taking-off aircraft and crossing aircraft. 
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Communication between controllers and aircraft 
crews is via standard VHF R/T. Communication 
between controllers is supported by telephone lines. 
Monitoring by the controllers can be by direct visual 
observation and is supported by radar track plots. 
Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual 
observation and is supported by the VHF R/T party-
line effect. 
In the runway crossing operation considered, the 
control over the crossing aircraft is transferred from 
the ground controller to the controller of the runway 
to be crossed. If the runway controller is aware that 
its runway is not used for a take-off, the crew of an 
aircraft intending to cross is cleared to do so. The 
pilot not flying of the crossing aircraft acknowledges 
the clearance and then the pilot flying initiates the 
runway crossing. As soon as the crossing aircraft has 
vacated the runway, then the pilot not flying reports 
this to the controller of that runway. Next the control 
over the aircraft is transferred from this runway 
controller to either another runway controller or to 
the ground controller. 
 
y
x
x3
l
x3
s
stopbar
y3b
taxiway
entrance
a/c j
a/c i
 
Figure 1: Configuration of active runway crossing 
operation considered. Aircraft i and j respectively 
take off from a position at the runway start and 
taxi along a taxiway leading to a runway crossing 
at a given distance from the runway start. 
3.2 Joint model for integrated simulations  
The TOPAZ and Air-MIDAS simulation 
models consider the following human agents: pilots 
flying for both the taxi aircraft and the taking off 
aircraft, and the runway controller. The most 
important elements of these human and other entities 
are shortly described below. 
Pilot flying of taking-off aircraft 
Initially, the pilot flying (PF) of the taking-off 
aircraft has the situation awareness (SA) that take-off 
is allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-off 
the PF visually monitors the traffic situation on the 
runway. During a monitoring action the PF may not 
observe the crossing aircraft, because of a limited 
gaze angle or the distance with the crossing aircraft 
exceeds a viewing threshold, or occasional heads-
down time for engine parameter sampling. The 
monitoring process includes distance dependent error 
components. Furthermore, the PF monitors the VHF 
communication channel. The PF of the taking-off 
aircraft starts a collision avoiding braking action if 
(s)he observes the crossing aircraft within a critical 
distance of the runway centre-line or in reaction to a 
controller clearance, and (s)he decides that braking 
will stop the aircraft in front of the crossing aircraft. 
Pilot flying of taxiing aircraft 
Initially, the PF of the taxiing aircraft has the 
SA that either (s)he is taxiing on a regular taxiway, 
which does not cross a runway or (s)he is taxiing on a 
taxiway approaching the runway crossing. In the 
latter case the PF may have the SA that crossing is 
allowed. Both in the case that the PF has the SA that 
(s)he is taxiing on a regular taxiway and in the case 
that the PF is aware that a runway crossing is 
allowed, the PF proceeds on the runway crossing. 
During taxiing the PF visually monitors the traffic 
situation. The characteristics of the monitoring 
process depend on the SA of the PF concerning the 
next airport waypoint (either runway crossing or 
taxiway). After passage of the stopbar the PF may 
receive a hold clearance by the runway controller. 
There is a probability that the controller message is 
not properly understood by the PF. In response to a 
hold clearance or an observed conflict the PF initiates 
braking of the aircraft, unless the cockpit of the 
crossing aircraft is estimated to be already within a 
critical distance of the runway centre-line. 
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Runway controller 
The runway controller visually monitors the 
traffic situation on the runway. There is a probability 
that during monitoring an aircraft is not observed. In 
response to an alert, the controller directly monitors 
the traffic situation and the TOPAZ controller model 
updates the SA. If the controller is aware that the 
crossing aircraft has passed the stopbar then (s)he 
specifies a hold clearance to both the crossing and the 
taking-off aircraft. 
3.3  Parameters jointly represented 
As noted, the representations that the two 
simulation modeling systems provide are in some 
ways similar and in others different. Upon 
examination of the similarities and differences of the 
models used for the surface operation considered by 
Air MIDAS and by the TOPZ-TAXIR toolset, a list 
of model parameters to be affected by the joint runs 
was identified. These parameters are grouped and 
provided as follows: 
• braking initiation times of pilots flying; 
• inter-monitoring time of pilot flying of 
taxiing aircraft; 
• duration of visual observation of pilots 
flying. 
 
4.  Air-MIDAS results and use by 
TOPAZ-TAXIR 
4.1 Braking initiation time of PF’s 
This parameter group includes the braking 
initiation times of pilots flying of taking-off or 
taxiing aircraft in either tactical of opportunistic 
mode, when they have become aware of a conflict 
with the other aircraft. In Figure 2 an overview is 
provided of the probability density functions (PDF’s) 
and related parameter values for Air-MIDAS and the  
original and the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR. In all 
three models equal PDF types and parameter values 
for the braking initiation times are chosen for the 
pilots flying of the taking-off and taxiing aircraft, 
regardless of their cognitive control modes. 
It can be observed that in comparison to Air-
MIDAS, the original TOPAZ-TAXIR has a smaller 
mean braking initiation time, and a larger tail 
(probability of more than 5 s initiation time). In order 
to improve on these aspects, for the modified 
TOPAZ-TAXIR model the Rayleigh PDF has been 
selected. The improvements are:  
• its shape better fits to the Air-MIDAS data,  
• it supports positive values only,  
• has a more realistic tail than Gaussian PDF 
The parameter value of the Rayleigh PDF has 
been chosen such that its standard deviation equals 
the standard deviation of the PDF chosen in Air-
MIDAS. 
0 2 4 60
0.5
1
1.5
time [s]
0 2 4 610
−6
10−4
10−2
100
102
time [s]
 
Figure 2: Probability density functions for 
braking initiation time on a linear scale (top 
figure) and a logarithmic scale (lower figure). Air-
MIDAS (continuous line): Gaussian PDF with 
µ=2, σ=0.8. Original TOPAZ-TAXIR (dotted 
line): exponential PDF with µ=0.67, σ=0.67. 
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR (dashed line): Rayleigh 
PDF with µ=1.53, σ=0.8. 
4.2 Inter-monitoring time of PF of taxiing 
aircraft 
It is assumed in TOPAZ-TAXIR that the inter-
monitoring time of the pilot flying of the taxiing 
aircraft is independent from the cognitive control 
mode of the pilot. In the original model this time was 
represented by an exponential probability density 
  
NLR-TP-2006-682
 
   
6
6 
function. Simulations of Air-MIDAS resulted in a 
data-set of 536 inter-monitoring times of the taxiing 
pilot flying. An histogram of this data-set is shown in 
Figure 3. It can be observed that this histogram can 
be well represented by an exponential PDF. 
Therefore, in the modified model the inter-
monitoring times of the taxiing PF are also chosen 
from an exponential PDF with a mean equal to the 
estimated mean of the Air-MIDAS data.  
 
 
0 5 10 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
time [s]
 
Figure 3: Data of inter-monitoring times of the PF 
of taxiing aircraft. Air-MIDAS (bars): normalized 
histogram of data ( 8.1,1.2 == σµ !! ). Original 
TOPAZ-TAXIR (dotted line): exponential PDF 
with µ=3.0, σ=3.0. Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR 
(dashed line): exponential PDF with µ=2.1, σ=2.1. 
4.3. Duration of visual observation of PF’s 
This parameter group includes the visual 
observation times of pilots flying for the taking-off or 
taxiing aircraft in either tactical of opportunistic 
mode. The PDF’s of these times in the original model 
are exponential PDF’s with a mean that is smaller in 
the opportunistic mode than in the tactical mode. 
Air-MIDAS simulations provided data on the 
duration of the tasks: 
• ‘Monitor Out The Window’ for the PF of the 
taking-off aircraft, and 
• ‘Decide Action - Decide Take-off Spotted’ 
for the PF of the taxiing aircraft. 
These tasks were found to be in good agreement with 
the visual observation tasks of the pilots flying of the 
taking-off and taxiing aircraft, respectively. These 
data were provided for the three control modes used 
in Air-MIDAS. 
Histograms of the Air-MIDAS data are shown 
in Figure 4. In these data there are no statistically 
significant differences between the visual 
observation times for the two control mode 
categories. Hence, for the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR 
model it is assumed that the shape of the probability 
density functions does not depend of the control 
mode.  
 It can be observed in Figure 4A,B,C that the 
histograms of the visual observation time of the PF 
of the taking-off aircraft can be reasonably 
approximated by uniform PDF’s with a lower bound 
of 0.5 and an upper bound of 1.5. Therefore this 
simple representation was chosen in the modified 
model (see Figure 5). For the PF of the taxiing 
aircraft, the Air-MIDAS data indicate that the 
variance of the visual observation duration is smaller 
than for the PF of the taxiing aircraft (see Figure 
4.D,E,F), whereas their means are about equal. To 
not unduly complicate the TOPAZ-TAXIR model 
and since there are no manifest reasons why the PDF 
of the visual observation duration should be different 
for pilots flying of the taking-off and taxiing aircraft, 
the PDF for the taxiing aircraft case is chosen equal 
to PDF for the taking-off aircraft case. 
5. Integration Impact on Collision 
Risk Model 
In Table 2 the collision risk results of both 
versions of TOPAZ-TAXIR are shown for three 
values of the distance of the runway crossing with 
respect to the runway start threshold. It follows from 
these results that the collision risks as evaluated by 
the modified model are smaller than those evaluated 
by the original model and that the relative differences 
in collision risk tend to get larger for larger crossing 
distances. In all cases, the difference between the 
results is within a factor two. 
Table 2: Collision risks evaluated by the original 
and modified TOPAZ-TAXIR models for three 
crossing distances.  
Crossing 
distance 
Original 
Collision Risk 
(occurrence per 
take-off) 
Modified 
Collision Risk 
(occurrence per 
take-off) 
500 m 1.3 10-8 1.2 10-8 
1000 m 1.1 10-8 7.1 10-9 
2000 m 8.0 10-9 4.4 10-9 
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0 1 2
0
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3
4
time [s]
 A: Take-off PF Air-MIDAS Knowledge
0 1 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 B: Take-off PF Air-MIDAS Rule
0 1 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 C: Take-off PF Air-MIDAS Skill
0 1 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 D: Taxi PF Air-MIDAS Knowledge
0 1 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 E: Taxi PF Air-MIDAS Rule
0 1 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 F: Taxi PF Air-MIDAS Skill
 
Figure 4: Air-MIDAS data of visual observation times of the PF’s of taking-off aircraft (upper figures) and 
taxiing aircraft (bottom figures), when control mode are Knowledge-based (left), Rule-based (centre) or Skill-
based (right). The dashed lines picture the uniform density fits adopted versus the normalized histograms.  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 A: Take-off PF TOPAZ-TAXIR Tactical
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 B: Take-off PF TOPAZ-TAXIR Opportunistic
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 C: Taxi PF TOPAZ-TAXIR Tactical
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
time [s]
 D: Taxi PF TOPAZ-TAXIR Opportunistic
 
Figure 5: TOPAZ-TAXIR probability density functions of visual observation times of the PF’s of taking-off 
aircraft (upper figures) and taxiing aircraft (bottom figures), while the control mode is similar to tactical 
(left) or opportunistic (right). Original (dotted lines): exponential PDF’s. Modified (dashed lines): uniform 
PDF’s. 
  
NLR-TP-2006-682
 
   
8
8 
The collision risk value that result from the 
TOPAZ-TAXIR simulations is composed of risk 
contributions from combinatorially many event 
sequences (Stroeve et al., 2003). In particular, the 
event sequence classes include the status of technical 
systems, such as alerting systems and communication 
systems, aircraft types, and human operator situation 
awareness. Since the adaptations of TOPAZ-TAXIR 
in the integration process with Air-MIDAS all 
consider assumptions regarding the behaviour of 
pilots flying, it is interesting to compare the risk 
decomposition for a pilot flying in the original and 
modified models. In particular, in Figure 6, collision 
risk results are shown for the situations that  
• the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft believes  
to be on a regular taxiway, or 
• The pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft 
believes that runway crossing is allowed. 
 
 
 
In the first case the pilot is lost, in the second case 
the situation awareness corresponds well with the 
actual position of the aircraft. 
It can be observed in Figure 6 that in both the 
original and the modified model, the risk contribution 
for the situation that the pilot is aware to be on a 
regular taxiway exceeds the risk contribution for the 
situation that the pilot is aware to be on a runway 
crossing. However, the difference between those risk 
contributions is smaller in the modified model than in 
the original model.  
On the one hand, the reduced difference in the 
risk contributions between the model versions is due 
to an increase in the risk contribution for the situation 
that the pilot flying is aware to be on a runway 
crossing in the modified model. The model 
modifications that may effect this risk increase 
concern the braking initiation times by the pilots 
flying of both aircraft, and the duration of the visual 
observation tasks of the pilots flying of both aircraft. 
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Figure 6: Total risk per take-off aircraft to collide with a crossing aircraft and contributions to this by correct 
and incorrect SA by the PF of the crossing aircraft; left for the original, right for the modified TOPAZ-
TAXIR model. 
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For a further evaluation of the effects of these 
modifications a sensitivity analysis is required. As a 
preliminary finding, the risk increase is especially 
due to the increase in mean braking initiation times 
and may be to a smaller extent due to the increase in 
mean visual observation time in the opportunistic 
mode. 
On the other hand, the reduced difference in the 
risk contributions between the model versions is due 
to a decrease in the risk contribution for the situation 
that the pilot flying is aware to be on a regular 
taxiway in the modified model. The risk decrease in 
this situation is effected by all model modifications. 
The combined effect of the changes in the braking 
initiation times and the visual observation times is a 
risk increase. The decrease in the mean inter-
monitoring time of the pilot flying of the taxiing 
aircraft leads to a risk decrease because it causes the 
pilot to monitors for conflicting traffic more often. 
The combined effect turns out to decrease risk. 
6. Conclusions 
The results showed that the Air-MIDAS based 
adaptation did lead up to a factor two reduction in 
assessed collision risk level. This result alone 
demonstrates that it is feasible and useful to couple 
Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ. More importantly this 
means that we have now running two human 
performance simulations for more or less the same 
situation. This gave us the unique chance to make 
further comparisons between the two simulation 
approaches.   
We examined the change in collision risk 
assessment resultant from the integration of these two 
models.  In the scenario examined, the actions of the 
flight crew and ATC are largely perceptual-motor 
response to runway incursion.  The impact 
assessment reported reflects the change in those 
characteristics.  More complex decision making or 
coordinated action among agents and safety 
augmentation technologies would require full 
representation of the models of those more complex 
interactions.  
In order to recognize the logical pattern in these 
differences, one should be aware that both are aimed 
to assess quite different top-level metrics. Air-
MIDAS top-level metric is the behavioral pattern of 
human operators; while TOPAZ top-level metric is 
collision risk. The implied focal attention in TOPAZ 
is on performance, error making and error 
propagation among multiple agents versus memory 
and task scheduling and performance in Air-MIDAS. 
For error mechanisms the error recovery model of 
Amalberti & Wioland (1997) has been reported for 
two types of stress levels. This is reflected by the two 
control modes of TOPAZ and avoids the need to 
model a lot of memory and task performance 
characteristics. In Air-MIDAS the adoption of the 
Skill Rule Knowledge (SRK) model of Rasmussen 
for task performance leads to three control modes, 
and with this the need to model memory and task 
scheduling and performance in detail. The 
complementarity of TOPAZ and Air-MIDAS makes 
it so interesting to compare simulation results 
obtained by both approaches. 
Both for Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ, a proper 
work breakdown and scheduling mechanism of 
subtasks is very important in order to make effective 
use of the human resources available in the model. 
The more complete task breakdown within Air-
MIDAS yields a greater level of detail, and cognitive 
psychological expertise is often used to fill in the 
parameter values. The nice thing about this is that the 
model can partly be validated by walkthroughs by 
cognitive psychologists. However the larger detail 
also implies that there also is more to be validated 
than with the less detailed approach of TOPAZ.  
From a validation perspective both approaches 
have much in common: they produce results on basis 
of carrying out simulations with a 
mathematical/computational model and by its very 
nature, a mathematical/computational model differs 
from reality. In order to validate a 
mathematical/computational model in a systematic 
way, the following activities should be performed: 
• Identification of the differences between the 
mathematical model and the reality, and 
• Assessment of the effect of these differences 
on the value of the output metric(s). 
This validation process termed bias and uncertainty 
assessment is scheduled to be undertaken for the 
integrated simulations of Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ-
TAXIR for the runway operation considered.  
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